These class notes were composed by Dr. Tom O'Connor for his class on Homeland Security at NORTH CAROLINA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, original documents can be found here

THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
"Nothing worth doing is completed in a single lifetime" (Reinhold Niebuhr)

    In just a few short years, the massive intergovernmental reorganization project known as homeland security has made amazing progress, yet there is still a long way to go toward the day when everyone feels "all is well," and not just because of "fantasy documents" (Clarke 1999), but because trust in government (competent, expert authorities) has been restored.  If restoration of this kind is taken as part of homeland security's job, then it's probably going to be a while before DHS (or any other agency) can accomplish this, if it's even possible.  What is likely to happen is production of a nation of patriots and "social patriots" (those who disagree or dissent, but do so respectfully) but only after long periods or cycles of bitter polarizations.  Definitions of terrorism are likely to clarify in the long run, but terrorism itself will probably never be over (just mutated into other forms or perhaps reverted back to revolutionary forms).  Likewise, other future threats will probably develop (and undevelop) that aren't necessarily man-made.  Things like the upcoming pandemic, the H5N1 "bird flu" virus, as well as other epidemics, will most likely test the limits of things like border security and quarantine enforcement.  Many practices and procedures will have probably become standardized by then, and maybe even education and training (which is always at risk of becoming "stale" and seemingly in need of newer pedagogies and platforms all the time).  In most respects, most communities will feel safer than ever, but perhaps none may ever reach the "all clear" stage again, if indeed, it could be said, they ever reached it.

  As a citizenry, the United States has gone through a period of unrivaled emotional turmoil, an atmosphere of urgency, and an upsurge in patriotism unequalled in most peoples' memory.  This makes it a good time, in at least one sense, to step back and assess what's been done, not just in terms of what's been accomplished and which ambitions were perhaps too unrealistic, but to assess the overall direction of change.  It must be remembered that no less than three "wars" are currently going on: a war on crime, a war on drugs, and a war on terrorism.  This makes the game more complicated (systematic) and it's entirely possible that success in one theatre of war will spell out failure in another, or at least all sorts of backlashes or thermostatic effects can be expected.  A realistic synergistic solution might be to give up on one war at least, so the policy choices become decriminalization overall -- retaining anti-terrorism and related (mutated) offenses as crime categories -- or legalization of drugs.  Giving up one war to fight another poses difficult enough issues for political science, but imagine the sociological task of ascertaining a homeland security return to public confidence.           

    As usual, there are significant political issues at stake, with perhaps the most important one being whether or not the priorities of homeland security will continue to receive political support and funding past the second term of the George W. Bush administration.  One-party politics is unlikely to be sustainable over the long-run during any national security crisis.  If anything, the lesson from other nations is that governing parties change more often under such conditions.  One never knows, however, as the American people are fairly unpredictable on these matters.  Other significant issues involve the tradeoffs between order and civil liberties, isolationism and globalization, "academicization" and "vocationalization" of homeland security, as well as emerging new roles (employment opportunities) in a rapidly-changing public-private partnership economy.  This lecture tries to address at least some of those issues or at least parts of some of those issues.

FEDERALIZATION BY FINANCIAL CONTROL

    Let's first take a look at funding for homeland security, especially in how federal assistance trickles down (or does not) to state and local authorities.  A recurrent and continuing policy dilemma exists in where the money comes from and where it  should go.  For example, it can be asked if whether it is better to allocate scarce resources on high risk/highly symbolic targets or just spread the protection evenly throughout the nation.  However, other dilemmas exist in the policy process which are evident when we look at budgets and the like.  Spending on homeland security obviously competes budgetarily with other priorities, and there eventually must be some accountability and progress seen at the local level.  Toward that end, it appears that the present pattern of federal assistance involves a benchmark-based, grant-disbursement mechanism.  The following section outlines this pattern of grant funding where the reader's attention ought to be directed toward areas that require competition and merit, areas that only require a base or population formula, and other areas based on pre-negotiated plans and so forth.  It is definitely a pattern of "Big Brother knows best," as can be seen from the following comprehensive overview of grant programs:

    POLITICIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION

    The "heavy hand" of the federal government is evident in how it doles money out to state and local authorities since most grant opportunities are only available to those who are lucky enough to be part of a pre-existing plan, live in a high density/high threat area, have a pre-designated FEMA team, meet the criteria for merit, have matching funds available, and see no problem with the natural superiority of National Fire Academy and FBI training.  However, this only represents a "purse strings" type of control over the future directions of homeland security.  The processes of politicization (and privatization) are much more evident in the 2002-2005 struggle by the President and Secretary of DHS to replace some 2,000 pages of Civil Service personnel rules with the flexibility to basically "hire and fire" at will.  Civil service rules are laid out in Title 5 of the United States Code, and new homeland security legislation creates a new chapter in Title 5 drastically modifying the DHS human resources system.  Unions such as AFGE and NBPC, to name a few, fear that the Bush administration and/or future leadership will use the new legislation to erode collective bargaining and weaken or eliminate unions.  This labor matter is so important that perhaps we ought to digress a bit upon the history of Civil Service.

    The rule changes for establishing a new human resources system for DHS employees have already been approved by Congress, and the new overhauled procedures have yet to be announced (expected in January or February of 2005).  Once they are announced, hundreds of thousands of workers in the junior and mid-level GS ranks will be affected, as well as SES personnel.  It will be one of the most far-reaching changes in civil service rules since the CSRA of 1978, but in many ways HSA 2002 is less "academic" and theory-driven than CSRA (Ingraham & Rosenbloom 1992).  HSA 2002 will probably serve as a model for other government agencies seeking more flexible ways to hire, pay and discipline employees. The Pentagon, for example, has long been interested in changing its civil service rules.  In addition, the Bush administration has said it intends to "outsource" or privatize as many as 850,000 other jobs in upcoming years, and this number represents about half the federal civilian workforce.  Privatization usually means that merit-based competition for future job vacancies will be more open to the public and private contractors.  Some bids from private contractors may very well involve taking over the functions for a complete "pool" of employees, and in this sense, outsourcing will occur.

    As a commentary, it should be said that theoretically, at least, the purpose of civil service is to make nonpartisanship the norm.  Career civil service employees should NOT be replaced by political appointees, or any system that subverts civil service to the slippery slope of increased reliance on the functional equivalent of political appointments (although there are many good political appointees).  Loyalty and flexibility are probably important to build into the system, but when taken to extremes, might smack of gross partisanship and have negative consequences in the future.  Far more important, especially with intelligence and homeland security work, is to build a system where principled (and sometimes partisan) support for the President occurs along with opportunities for principled resistance as well.  Having civil servants who sometimes resist presidential policy doesn't sound like a recipe for effective government, but "the bureaucracy" has long been recognized as an essential part of the way in which "public interest" is protected in this country (Wilson 1991; Golden 2000).  The danger of too much partisanship and a presidentialist bias is the danger of ultra vires, which refers to that legal concept in corporate and administrative law where employees overstep their bounds and act with more authority than what they really have.  It is also useful to reflect upon the advantages and disadvantages of privatization, which is a subject that the field of criminal justice is very well experienced with.  The following is a short summary of those experiences:

ACADEMICS AND HOMELAND SECURITY

    About 600,000 foreign students study regularly in the United States, and most of these are international graduate students that universities depend on for teaching and research help, particularly in scientific and engineering fields.  Foreign students make up well over 50% of students at the Masters and Ph.D. levels in America in some departments, provide at least $12 billion annually to the U.S. economy, and are largely concentrated in programs of study that have high tech, national security, or vital interest implications (e.g., computer science, biotechnology, structural engineering, mathematics).  Also, regardless of whether you want to call it "brain drain," "brain gain," or "brain mobility," an additional 400,000 foreign faculty have left or are leaving their home country to obtain work as professors in American colleges and universities, with some 100,000 foreign faculty working in medical schools alone.  If all the foreign grad students were assigned as teaching assistants to complement the number of foreign teaching faculty, that would leave only 200,000 American-born professors in the nation's colleges and universities, since there are only 1.2 million Ph.D. level professor jobs in the U.S.  In addition, an unknown number of foreign scientists pass in and out of the U.S. annually to attend scientific conferences.  If terrorist groups wanted to learn how to make weapons of mass destruction, study the inner vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures, or plan better strategies to thwart governance by democracy, they could do no worse than figure out a way to infiltrate or utilize the vast foreign scholarly presence at America's colleges and universities.  It is imperative that homeland security address this "academic threat" in a sensitive manner, and at the same time, avoid any perception that the U.S. is not a "welcoming" country for scientific and scholarly exchange. This is going to be a challenging and difficult problem for homeland security.

    Traditionally, the U.S. has used SEVIS and other methods (VISA-Condor and NCIC-III) for screening and monitoring foreign student and scholarly activity, but since 9/11, some old tactics resurfaced, such as harassment, delay, fingerprinting, and "checking in" with immigration officials.  Delays in getting visa approval became considerably long after 9/11.  A Visa Mantis security check on visiting foreign scientists (working in sensitive scientific and technical areas identified by a TAL, or Technology Alert List) took an average of 67 days, and some applicants had to wait 80 days or more before even getting an interview to start the process.  American university officials started complaining loudly about these delays as early as 2003 because they were losing revenue to competitor schools in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.  Starting in 2005, embassies have attempted to speed up the process, and the Dept. of Homeland Security has promised to drop the average time for scholar background checks to 14 days.  Other reforms have been made affecting cleared foreign scientists, such as: extending certain student F visas for four years; extending temporary worker H visas, exchange visitor J visas, and intracompany transfer L visas for two years; and keeping business (B-1) and pleasure (B-2) visitors down to one year extensions.  In the current climate, everyone wants to support the free circulation of scientists, but the details of how to do it in an age of terrorism are elusive and frustrating.  The situation is not likely to change in the future, as the scientific community and university systems will continue to advocate much less homeland security bureaucracy at the risk of creating more openness and less security.  Until improvements are made in the way intelligence data are applied to the problem, and consular officers are trained in the use of such technology (Dorman 2003), current systems will likely remain as confusing, inconvenient, and politically sensitive as they are now.  Real reform may only come when the foreign service and academics agree upon needed changes, since foreign service officers in embassies must approve or deny visa applications by academics. As Steigman (1985) might have put it, America's foreign service is the first line of defense in homeland security.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

    Other homeland security issues involving academics center around the on- and off-campus problems of so-called "radical" or "extremist" professors, professors with criminal backgrounds, and anti-war, revolutionary professors with an anti-Israeli or anti-U.S. bias or who just philosophically oppose any security-related intrusion into the territory of academic freedom or the right to explore all sides of the political spectrum.  In fact, it is clearly evident that the university professors' union-like association, the AAUP, stands firmly opposed to any political intrusions on academic freedom.  It is unknown exactly how many "dangerous" or "menacing" professors exist, but if history is a guide, then seventy (70) appears to be a good number, since that's how many were officially "blacklisted" as un-American teachers during the 1951-1955 McCarthy Era, although an additional 400 were suspected of "un-American activities" but never blacklisted from holding professor jobs.  Popular websites like FrontPageMag and Campus Watch (to name two) chronicle the ongoing debates and developments in this area, and David Horowitz (2004), a liberal veteran of the McCarthy Era turned conservative reactionary, has been at the forefront (along with Daniel Pipes) at exposing the nation's "too-liberal" professors who can be accused of various things, such as: "giving aid and comfort to the enemy," "siding with the enemy in a time of war," and saying 9/11 was a case of the chickens coming home to roost, America is the world's most terrorist nation, or one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter, etc.

    It might be instructive to analyze a few cases of academics who have been involved in academic freedom controversies.  Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, University of New Mexico Professor Richard Berthold bluntly proclaimed to his students, "Anyone who can blow up the Pentagon would get my vote."  He claimed it was a joke, but was suspended from teaching for a semester.  Shortly afterwards but still during 2001, a University of South Florida professor of computer science, Dr. Samuel Al-Arian, who is of Palestinian descent, came under criticism for making statements such as "Victory to Islam; Death to Israel."  A federal investigation ensued and discovered that the professor had ties to international terrorist groups.  The university suspended him without pay and banned him from campus.  He eventually lost tenure and was fired.  Federal authorities jailed him on conspiracy charges.  Also in 2001, Baylor University professor of Jewish Studies, Marc Ellis, garnered controversy over the extent to which the courses he taught either denied the Holocaust or more accurately claimed that Jews point to the Holocaust to distract attention from Israeli crimes against Palestinians.  Prof. Ellis' outspoken, anti-Zionist views have made him the "poster boy" for academic anti-Semitism on college campuses, ironic considering that he is Jewish, but understandable given that he sees the war on terrorism as a Christian crusade.  One can imagine the battles and outcries that have rocked this predominatly Baptist campus.  Numerous other campuses were rocked with controversy in the wake of 9/11.  For example, fights broke out between students at Boston College, students at UNLV chased Marine recruiters off, students burned the flag or had it torn down at Marquette and Arizona State, and Muslim student groups celebrated terrorist acts at places like San Diego State and UNC-Chapel Hill.  

    During 2002, several students and professors at Harvard and Yale started suing one another (and their schools) for libel in reaction to criticisms of their outspoken views on 9/11 and the war on terror.  Particularly at Yale, threats of lawsuits and charges of censorship extended to the student newspaper there, as two parties, Andrew Sullivan (a right-wing blogger) and Glenda Gilmore, chair of the History Dept., fought it out over whether Saddam Hussein was such a bad guy and whether Prof. Gilmore (in Sullivan's opinion) was among the nation's top five professors who hate America for saying that it is an aggressor nation who is its own worst enemy (see Daniel Pipes' article "Why Do So Many Professors Hate America?")  

    Early in 2003, a Columbia professor of anthropology named Nicholas De Genova got in trouble during an anti-war rally calling for "a million Mogadishus" against American soldiers fighting the war on terrorism.  He went on to say that American soldiers in Iraq should throw grenades at their own officers; that U.S. patriotism is inseparable from imperial warfare and white supremacy; that the U.S. flag is the emblem of a war machine; and that the only true heroes are those who find ways that help defeat the U.S. military.  As you can imagine, there was intense fury over these comments, and the university had to provide a special security detachment for the professor.  The President of the college backed him up, mostly because his comments were made outside of the classroom.  Also in 2003, a professor was accused of having ties to terrorism, this time an Honors College professor, Dr. Mustafa Abu Sway, at Florida Atlantic University, who has since moved on to teaching for online schools overseas.

    In 2004, further scandal erupted at Columbia University where at least one Middle East Studies professor there referred to supporters of Israel as "Gestapo apparatchiks" and was accused of indoctrinating students in the classroom.  All in all, there are about seven or eight Columbia professors who regularly mouth anti-American sentiments (see Daniel Pipes' article "Columbia vs. America").  In response, the President and Provost of Columbia decided to create a counterbalancing department of Israeli Studies.

    In 2005, professors at Northeastern University, the University of Colorado at Boulder, the Univ. of Texas at Austin, and North Carolina Wesleyan either got in trouble or gained notoriety for comments along the lines of "the terrorists deserve to win," "the 9/11 victims deserved to die," or "9/11 was a government plot."  Most people are familiar with the Prof. Ward Churchill controversy at Boulder where his comment that "More 9-11s are needed” can be interpreted two ways -- either as a pro-terrorist and anti-American statement; or as only saying that it may take more 9-11s before the American people wake up to the real causes of such attacks.  Many people may also be familiar with Prof. Robert Jensen (see website), an activist in the School of Journalism at Austin who proudly proclaims himself "a critic of the U.S. empire" and ranks himself up there in leftist popularity along with MIT professor Noam Chomsky (see website) who's last book, Hegemony or Survival, is dedicated to the proposition that America is a threat to the survival of the planet.  Some people may also be familiar with Professor "Jihad Jane" in North Carolina who taught an political science course named after one of Alex Jones' videos, 9/11 and the Road to Tyranny. For more on some of these cases (and the nature of academic dissent generally), see the Lecture on Academic Dissent and National Security.

    With the rare exceptions of where federal investigators got involved, most cases have involved rather mild discipline, if any, against the professors.  It may be time to rethink the American system of tenure for college professors which has existed since 1940, and has regularly provided a protective screen (along with lawyers, the ACLU, and the AAUP) behind which "harmful speech" and indoctrination of students may be occurring.  On the other hand, it may be fruitful to let American campuses become the "battleground of ideas" that they were, in part, designed for.  In any event, the role of campus culture and climate is something that may or may not have implications for the future of homeland security.                        

INTERNET RESOURCES
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (their DHS Workers page)
An Explanation of Foreign National Visa Security Processes
Brian Friel's "Unshackled" Article on Civil Service Rules (GovExecMag copy)
Campus Watch
Career/Employment Opportunities in Disaster Management
Center for the Study of Popular Culture (CSPC)
College Freedom: A Website about Academic Freedom and Patriotic Correctness
Corporation for National & Community Service
Dealing with Foreign Students & Scholars in an Age of Terrorism (pdf)
Defense Tech Blogspot: The Future of Military, Law Enforcement & National Security
GAO Report on Delays in the Visa Mantis System (pdf)
Monitoring Foreign Students in the United States: A History (pdf)
NAFSA Association for International Educators Website
National Academies Website on Scientific Travel Overseas
National Border Patrol Council (NBPC) Labor Organization
NewsMax Link to David Horowitz' Center for the Study of Popular Culture (CSPC)
Ohio State's International and Homeland Security Program
Political Tests and Loyalty Oaths for Professors during the McCarthy Era
Special Report on Securing the Homeland (Oct 2004 pdf)
Students for Academic Freedom: SAF Home Page for Campus Chapters

PRINTED RESOURCES
Bullock, J., Haddow, G., Coppola, D., Ergin, E., Westerman, L. & Yeletaysi, S. (2005). Introduction to Homeland Security. Boston: Elsevier.
Clark, L. (1999). Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Dorman, S. (2003). Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America. Washington DC: American Foreign Service Association. [publisher's website]
Duncan, S. (2004). A War of a Different Kind: Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
Golden, M. (2000). What Motivates Bureaucrats? NY: Columbia Univ. Press. [sample excerpt]
Haddow, G. & Bullock, J. (2003). Introduction to Emergency Management. Boston: Elsevier.
Horowitz, D. (2004). Unholy Alliance: Radical Islam and the American Left. Washington DC: Regnery.
Horowitz, D. & Johnson, B. (Eds.) (2004). Campus Support for Terrorism. Los Angeles: CSPC.
Hutton, D. & Mydlarz, A. (2003). Guide to Homeland Security Careers. Hauppauge, NY: Barrons.
Ingraham, P. & Rosenbloom, D. (Eds.) (1992). The Promise and Paradox of Civil Service Reform. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.
Kemp, R. (2003). "The Future of Homeland Security." Pp. 135-143 in R. Kemp (ed.) Homeland Security: Best Practices for Local Government. Washington DC: ICMA.
Kettl. D. (2004). System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics. Washington DC: CQ Press.
Krislow, D. (2004). "Civil Liberties and the Judiciary in the Aftermath of 9/11." Pp. 134-159 in W. Crotty (ed.) The Politics of Terror. Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press.
O'Hanlon, M., Orszag, P, Daalder, I., Destler, I., Gunter, D., Litan, R. & Steinberg, J. (2003). Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On. Washington DC: Brookings.
O'Neil, R. (1994). The Rights of Public Employees: The Basic ACLU Guide. Carbondale, IL: SIU Press.
Ranum, M. (2003). The Myth of Homeland Security. NY: Wiley.
Shafritz, J. et. al. (2001). Personnel Management in Government, 5e. NY: Marcel Dekker.
Steigman, A. (1985). The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Wilson, J.Q. (1991). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. NY: Basic.

Last updated: 01/17/06
Syllabus for JUS 415 (Homeland Security)
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