RESPONSE AND RECOVERY

These class notes were composed by Dr. Tom O'Connor for his class on Homeland Security at NORTH CAROLINA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, original documents can be found here

RESPONSE AND RECOVERY
"Courage is the judgment that something else is more important than fear" (Ambrose Redmoon)

It will be remembered from the previous lecture on Mitigation and Preparedness that Response is defined as an immediate reaction or relief effort focused on saving lives, and Recovery is the process of repair and restoration. It might also be remembered that a discussion of evacuation (usually discussed under mitigation) was delayed until this point, for this lecture will attempt to be more detailed about actual procedures in the post-disaster environment. Pretty much, everything discussed so far has dealt with the pre-disaster phase of emergency management. Now, it is to be assumed that catastrophe is at the door, and it is time to analyze some principles and issues unique to response and recovery.

As an example of unique principles, consider the notion of "redundancy" which means to have duplicate components that provide alternatives in case one component fails. It can be argued that redundancy is a good principle to follow with response and recovery. Everything up to this point has been, management-wise, characterized by cost-effectiveness or "mean and lean" resource utilization. However, the response phase, because it deals directly with saving lives; e.g., pulling survivors out of the rubble, should not be something that is underfunded and sacrifices redundancy. That doesn't mean it shouldn't be coordinated; it just means that a different set of principles might be involved. It's well-known that recovery is the costliest phase of emergency management (Bullock et. al. 2005), and maintaining the political willpower to completely rebuild after a catastrophe is a difficult challenge.

Like many areas of homeland security, the topics of response and recovery cannot be adequately discussed without confronting a whole lot of acronyms. Abbreviations for agencies, programs, centers, councils, and systems are plentiful and frequently change. While every effort is made to use the latest acronyms and spell out what they mean in this lecture, the reader may be forced to consult a Glossary of Acronyms found in a textbook or find an online glossary to refer to, such as FEMA's List of Acronyms, or a state-level list, such as North Carolina's List of Acronyms or Washington State's List of Acronyms (pdf). Specialized glossaries may need to be sought for specialized areas.

Reference will also be made to the names of various federal plans in this lecture that frequently change or have various timetables; e.g., the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and the Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN, to name a few examples. This area of learning can be overwhelming, but as Bullock et. al. (2005) simplify it, the NRP (currently in its Initial form, intended to replace the FRP) and the NIMS are probably the two most important documents to focus on. Readers are advised to exercise care in obtaining the latest copies of these documents, and for that purpose, sites like NRT, NEMAWeb, NIMSonline are helpful as are other Internet Resources given at the end of this lecture. Also, as a word of warning, certain resources referred to here may be difficult if not impossible to find. For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) is not in the habit of making their documents publicly available, so access to them depends upon the good graces of people, like legislators, foundations, or private citizens, who post copies at their personal websites.

Some terms you may encounter in any discussion of response and recovery are crisis and consequence management. Leadership in the Department of Homeland Security has strongly indicated they don't prefer those terms, and would like to see them modified and integrated into one function. However, it is worth spending some time on them for educational purposes. According to Fink (1986), crisis management is about "rolling with the punches" and taking seriously certain assumptions about the meaning of "crisis" (there's no time or way to recover) and, like the grief process, one just has to work through the critical emotions -- denial, anger and depression -- in order to keep from becoming immobilized. In management science, crisis management is associated with the topic of critical incident task analysis, and in criminal justice or police psychology, it is associated with the topic of critical incident stress debriefing. There are many counseling and social work enterprises which make their living off crisis management principles. The connections with homeland security are probably best understood by knowing that crisis counseling has always championed the cause of "speedy response."

There are no good definitions of consequence management. Generically, the term refers to ameliorative action that is quick, careful, and decisive. The word "consequence" is usually taken to mean an event of "high consequence" involving mass casualties, such as superterrorism or a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) incident. The concept involves a concern for surge capacity; such as the overwhelming of medical resources, as well as any lingering effects on public health and the environment in the post-disaster environment. For example, if after the best decontamination following a nuclear attack, all the government could do is assure some survivors a pain-free lifestyle for the two years or so they have left in their lifespan, this would be consequence management. In the security field, this is more generally known as contingency planning because "contingencies" are always those secondary possibilities that need to be covered in a back-up plan, and back-up planning, in many ways, is the essence of post-disaster recovery.

A critique: Both crisis and consequence management tend to defy attempts at coordination through a tiered continuum of response. They both aggressively compete for priorities which, in practice, detract from other resource utilization schemes and an all-hazards approach (in their calling for specialized services). Although their sense of urgency may be well-founded, the two concepts tend to devolve into public relations or public education efforts. Public education or information may very well be important, perhaps important enough to call it the sixth major function of incident command, but problems arise when it devolves into rhetoric and propaganda. For example, crisis management in business usually implies a public relations campaign to convince consumers that it's now safe to use a product. Such "feel-good," anodyne procedures have little place in homeland security efforts which seek nobler purposes than just "living with catastrophe." However, this matter will be taken up again in a subsequent lecture on Victim Issues.

Whenever the topic of catastrophe response is brought up, some of the most intelligent questions that can be asked include the following: "How much?," "Who's in charge?," and "What is to be done?" The answers to these questions will structure the discussion that follows. The "how much" question is only of theoretical interest if we take it to mean how many resources to throw into response. It's undoubtedly the correct answer that, to save lives, what must be done is whatever it takes. A much more practical slant is to inquire about budgets and funding. With the "who's in charge" question, one might think that the principles of incident command (as discussed in the Overview lecture) will apply, as usual, but we shall see how the complex nature of multijurisdictional, multiagency operations sometimes calls for unified or integrated command (which still doesn't violate the five major functions of incident command). And, of course, the "what is to be done" question is another way of asking "what is the role of first responder" in society.

Budgets and Funding (How Much?)
It's probably inherent in the nature of response that some programs are going to be overfunded and others underfunded, or in other words, that response capabilities will be lopsided. There are many organizations and people competing with one another for the privilege to save lives, secure the scene, maintain order, rescue and treat the injured, contain hazardous conditions, and retrieve the dead. Under the American system of federalism, all these things have been a local responsibility, and localities that experience more disasters per year than other localities can be expected to invest more heavily in their response capability. Hence, we can expect widespread variation in capability from state-to-state. Likewise, we know that some geographic areas experience more of a risk from some hazards than others. North Carolina's Division of EM, for instance, is more prepared to respond to hurricanes and floods, despite an all-hazards commitment, simply because those hazards occur more frequently in that state. However, the main reason for lopsidedness is the system of tiered continuum response which has long been in place for emergency response and recovery in the U.S. It goes like this:

There is a need for a better way of requesting and receiving federal assistance. Although a formal declaration does not have to be signed for the federal government to respond, the politics is such that sometimes a presidential declaration can be made in a few hours, sometimes in weeks, and sometimes not at all. The decision to make a declaration is the president's alone, and there are no criteria, laws, or regulations that govern the process. FEMA and DHS officials are supposed to pass on their recommendations based on damage assessment, which at least has some objective benchmarks (40% or more uninsured property loss), but when a state feels "overwhelmed" is something of a subjective process. In recent years, there has been a pattern for governors to be a bit inventive and "cry wolf" by requesting federal aid for the "slightest" of emergencies, such as snow removal and drought. Governors also tend to panic and order premature evacuations (see Report on 1996 Hurricanes Fran & Bertha). There is an appeals process, if a governor's request is turned down at the DHS or Presidential level, but those appeals won't be considered unless accompanied by hard data in damage assessments. Communities which have suffered the denial of a disaster declaration frequently turn to the SBA (Small Business Administration) or USDA (Dept. of Agriculture), both of whom administer separate disaster declaration programs (low-interest loans and a handful of grants). There are no good figures on the number of declaration denials per year, but from 1976 to 1997, the number of approved declarations for a "major disaster" have averaged 36 per year, and since 1998, they have numbered about 48 per year.

It's all about the money. FEMA (now part of DHS) pays for everything out of a Disaster Relief Fund, which is regulated by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief & Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended in 2000. The Fund is budgeted at about $325 million annually, but since the early 1990s, FEMA has been in the habit of going to Congress and getting supplemental funding to the tune of about $2.8 billion per year. The vast majority of this money goes into state treasuries under a 75-25% rule, which means that the federal share is 75% of the eligible costs for repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement. States must pick up the remaining 25%, but there are procedures for waiving this, if necessary, and there are procedures for being flexible about eligible costs. Some of the largest payouts are "in-lieu contributions" of up to 90% of eligible costs for NOT reconstructing in areas hardest hit by a disaster and where no public interest is served by rebuilding there. Also, FEMA reimburses the 27 federal agencies which sprang to the aid of a local community, using preexisting agreements concerning costs of services, and in accordance with the role these agencies play as partners in the FRP (Federal Response Plan) as fulfilling one or more of twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The NRP (National Response Plan), as you know, is scheduled to replace the FRP sometime soon (NRP has been revised twice in 2004), but one of the major changes has been to eliminate some of the 27 agencies with ESF roles and substitute DHS as the agency which performs these services and gets reimbursed under the Disaster Relief Fund. The NRP must be consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), so a graphic of NIMS should reflect NRP changes. It's jumping ahead to the "Who's in Charge" question by showing the graphics below, but it's important to note the significance of government reorganization at this point.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS)

National Incident Management System Chart

The Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN

Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN Chart

Unified Command (Who's in Charge?)
The above graphics of the NIMS and CONPLAN (taken from Bullock et. al. 2005 and the Web) illustrate some of the changes taking place as DHS assumes a lead agency role in disaster response and the FBI retains its lead agency role in domestic terrorism. Note that under NIMS, the number of Primary Federal Agencies responding to a declared disaster appears to have been cut back from 27 to 8; and that, under CONPLAN, the FBI has replaced incident command with something called "unified command." Before getting to the unified command level, however, there are two parallel processes running down the sides of the main trunk in the chart (indicated by dashed lines in the NIMS chart). These are (to the left) the Joint Information Centers (JIC) and (to the right) the Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Councils (EPPC). There are national, regional, and local versions of these. The JICs are incident-specific, which means they come together for the duration of the emergency and then disperse; while the EPPCs are proposed new standing organizations. Let's examine what the JICs and EPPCs do.

Next, let's examine a couple of new entities attached to the main trunk of the NIMS chart -- the REOCs (Regional Emergency Ops Centers) and the FBI's JOC (Joint Operating Center). Note that the JOC hooks up with the FBI's SIOC, so let's look at this also.

Unified command works best when there is a multiagency response, and such a response is characterized by back-up communications systems, shared intelligence architectures, shared public information services, and multijuridictional accountability. The fire chief or fire commissioner is always going to be the incident, or field commander. However, an Incident Command System (ICS) must be robust enough to provide for the adaptability needed when large numbers of personnel from multiple government agencies need to work together. To some extent, incident command is already capable of this flexibility because an ICS blends agency autonomy, management by objectives, unity integrity, functional clarity, and practices good span of control. These are the same management concepts and principles driving the unified command movement that is embedded in so many federal plans.

First responders in the United States are shamefully underfunded, understaffed, and undertrained. As anyone who has read NFPA's Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (pdf) knows, there is such a shortage of first responders that in 2003, Congress had to pass the First Responder Initiative, a $3.5 billion program of assistance to state and municipal authorities to pay for hiring more and paying the overtime costs of those already hired. The money is distributed as homeland security grants by DHS, and comes as a transfer (cutback) of funds from community policing programs, many of which were eliminated completely. Community policing cutbacks are a source of despair to organizations like IACP and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. The amount raised of $3.5 million represents a ten-fold increase in federal support for first responders from pre-9/11 levels, and there are organizations lobbying for more of an increase. The CRS Report on the First Responder Initiative (pdf) written by Ben Canada (2003) is quite instructive, and is excerpted as follows:

An Overview of Federal Assistance to First Responders

State and local governments obtain DHS money from four sources: (1) the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which pays for equipment, training, and technical expertise; (2) the Assistance to Firefighters Program, which channels money directly to local fire departments without the need for pass-through state administration; (3) the Emergency Management Planning and Assistance Account, which pays for state construction of Emergency Operations Centers, SERT, CERT, and urban search and rescue teams; and (4) the First Responder Initiative, which is intended to strengthen personnel capability, but states and localities have considerable discretion on how to spend. The amounts of money for these four programs, respectively, are: $1 billion, $750 million, $295 million, and $3.5 billion. Money for the First Responder Initiative came from drastic reductions in the Justice Department's COPS (community policing) program, the Byrne Memorial Grant (scholarships for police in college), and other law enforcement block grant program. The U.S. Conference of Mayors estimates that about 25% of any money received by localities will be used to compensate public safety employees for overtime, and the Administration and Congress are divided over the appropriateness of this, as it changes the typical focus of federal grant programs.

It's hard to get good numbers on the size of the first responder community. Counting the number of police agencies & personnel is a fine art, but estimates normally center around there being slightly less than a million (940,275) municipal law enforcement officers in the U.S., where fewer than half are "sworn" and have the power of arrest. Other estimates put the number at closer to 992,000 (Bullock et. al. 2005) due to post-9/11 hiring. Sheriff's departments add another 477,000 to the nation's police strength, but again, fewer than half are sworn. It is fairly well known that the U.S. has over 1 million firefighters, but nearly three-quarters of these are "volunteer" firefighters and half are deployed in rural areas protecting communities with fewer than 5,000 people and have no training or certification for structural fires. There are only 155,000 nationally registered emergency medical technicians (EMT) in the U.S., but many of them may not be eligible to officially register at the National Registry, and others don't register because it's only the policy in their state (like Virginia for instance) for paramedics to register. Traditionally, only police, firefighters, and EMT were considered true "first responders," but the DHS position is that amateurs, volunteers, nonprofits, tribal organizations, faith-based organizations, ham radio operators, and the like are the "First of First Responders." Congress and the Administration are divided (which means each want to micro-manage the dispersal of funds) over the appropriateness of amateurs receiving money. The official definition of a "first responder" as contained in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 is as follows:

There are other issues besides the most basic personnel issue of "who is a first responder." For example, there is the fairly important issue of college education, both undergraduate and graduate, in fields related to emergency management and homeland security. Criminal justice is a good candidate as a vehicle for fielding such educational programs, but other names might do just as good for at least getting the entry-level market in shape. Schools like Western Carolina University have not only jumped on the B.S. emergency management bandwagon, but have embraced the wisdom of online learning as well. A variety of programs like EKU's online master's in loss prevention and safety and the Naval Postgraduate School's online master's in homeland security can be found, and accreditation status in online higher ed is a good thing to know about whenever one explores this territory, and criminal justice, as a discipline, is also suffering a personnel shortage of qualified instructors with graduate degrees. There are currently over 80 junior college, undergraduate, and graduate programs that offer courses or degrees in emergency management and related fields (Bullock et. al. 2005), and to grow into a mature profession, those fields will need more higher education programs; ideally, ones that bridge the infamous "academic/training" divide or "liberal arts/vocational-technical" debates. FEMA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI) can be of help to higher education as a model for this challenge, as can groups like ANSER and a number of other exemplary training programs, all of which abound across agencies, markets, and military organizations (e.g., eArmyU and the like). Currently, training and education programs are expanding dramatically, but not dramatically enough. If non-traditional groups are going to be added to the definition of "first responder," then millions of volunteers are going to need to be trained and credentialed in some acceptable fashion, and thousands of others, even in law enforcement, are going to need what it takes to pass an FBI Security Clearance Process for all the joint information sharing that is planned.

There are technical and scientific skills needed to work in some first responder fields. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, needs scientists as much as it needs to beef up its capability for a lead agency role in nuclear terrorism. Also, consider one of America's most strategic resources -- the Strategic National Stockpile -- which is a CDC repository of antibiotics, antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV administrations, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items. It is designed to supplement any hospital or vendor stockpiles, and although it is NOT normally a first response tool, there is a 12-hour "push package" rapid response system. Other agencies have peculiar skill needs, such as the Department of Energy and its Nonproliferation and National Security division as well as Lawrence Livermore's Nuclear Threat Assessment program which uses "profiling" to help out with nuclear extortion threats.

Evacuation is the most effective way of reducing disaster-related deaths, but its effectiveness depends heavily upon the efficiency of alert and warning systems (at least an 8 hour warning is needed to be efficient), as well as a number of other factors, the least of which is trying to get more than 60% of the populace to obey an evacuation order. There are three kinds of evacuations: (1) precautionary, which is carried out before impact; (2) self-preservation, which is carried out during impact; and (3) rescue, which is carried out after impact (Alexander 2002). Precautionary, or preventive evacuations are the ones where most attention should be focused on, and they have six phases: decision, notification, preparation, response, verification, and return. An evacuation plan should exist that has been worked out on the basis of hazard and risk maps. Routes and evacuation centers need to have been designated. Persons with special needs should have registered beforehand for a place in any Special Needs Evacuation Center (SNEC) that exists. Many evacuees will find their own accommodations or "shelter-in-place" (which is appropriate for many disasters, including terrorist-related ones). Evacuation plan managers should give thought to conducting a census for what private structures are safe as well as look into the possibilities for requisitioning hotels, guest houses, and second homes. Evacuees require time to receive their orders, organize a departure, and get to a safe destination. It is to be expected that there will be bottlenecks, congestion, vehicle breakdowns, and resistance to authority, hence the need is great for police and/or civil-protection marshals. Urban evacuation requires dividing the city up into small sectors and establishing assembly areas which are used as triage or traffic control points. Hospitals, workplaces, and transportation hubs tend to need longer lead time than residences. No evacuation plan is ever going to be 100% successful in its implementation.

Search and rescue (SAR) is essential to be done in the first 24 hours, or otherwise, it is practically worthless. There are four types of SAR: (1) urban; (2) rural; (3) underground; and (4) marine. Urban SAR, sometimes called "heavy" rescue, is a "multi-hazard" discipline and FEMA administers the national response system for US&R. If a disaster warrants Urban Search & Rescue (US&R), DHS will deploy the three closest task forces within 6 hours of notification. There are a limited, unknown number of task forces, and each one consists of 62 highly specialized personnel with four canines and enough equipment to completely fill a military C-141 transport. Urban search and rescue specialties are search (locating victims), rescue or extrication (digging out victims), technical (engineering and structural specialists), and medical (stabilizing victims). Rural SAR is usually done by aircraft, which fly low and take stereographic pictures which are then interpreted for damage assessment and/or signs of victims. There are flying (sortie) patterns which mimic the kinds of search patterns used in criminal investigation, and underground SAR basically requires good rope skills. The U.S. Coast Guard has long had a reputation for excellence in the area of marine SAR. It helps that the U.S. coastline is wired with a network of VHF-FM antennae high sites which enable radio coverage out to 20 miles from shore, and Amver is the name for an extraordinary computerized, voluntary ship monitoring system for global coverage. The Coast Guard also has an extraordinary National Strike Force for oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents. The National Association for Search and Rescue (NASAR) maintains a good set of links to all the many facets and specialties in SAR.

All the phases of recovery include Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Post-Disaster Development. Sometimes recovery must begin before the emergency is over, but the relief and rehabilitation stages are definitely marked by the influx of humanitarian aid and relief organizations, such as Americares, Interaction, Oxfam, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Habitat for Humanity, Catholic, Mennonite, and Churches of Christ agencies, to name a few. All relief agencies like these are amazingly "liaisoned" with one another, and can do a good job of interagency coordination on their own, but it is essential that emergency management at least assist or be involved in the coordination.

    Restoration represents the initial stage of total recovery, and is characterized by a series of needs that must be fulfilled. Problems must be solved. Some of these problems may include; provisions for food, shelter, and other basic necessities for those who need them. Basic services, such as electricity and water supply, food delivery and public transportation, must be restored. Reconstruction generally involves the re-implementation of safer transportation and workplace systems. Post-disaster development must include measures which provide a firm basis for full recovery and re-development of the disaster area. The following criteria are used to evaluate development or redevelopment proposals:

    1. Would the proposed project exacerbate existing hazards?
    2. Would the project create new risks or cause secondary hazards?
    3. Would the development project put people at risk through the possibility that structures might collapse?
    4. Alternatively, to reduce the risks to manageable levels, would mitigation be excessively expensive?
    5. If not carried out, would potential damage in a disaster be excessive or high costing?

    It is wise during reconstruction to consider implementing the mitigation plan, if not already implemented in full. Structural mitigation measures available to emergency managers in the post-disaster environment can be wide-ranging. Engineers have evolved complex codes of practice to make buildings more resistant to hazards. Containment structures, blast protection, and security devices help protect places from terrorist attack. The benefit of structural measures is weighed in terms of damage and casualties, and benefits are weighed by measuring the cost in relation to the result of the measure. All structural measures should be evaluated in terms of costs and benefits, usually expressed over the finite design life of the structure in question. Cost can be calculated as the sum of the following:

    A. construction and continued maintenance, repair and administration of the structure
    B. environmental impact, assessed in many different ways with respect to flora, fauna, landscape aesthetics .
    C. any possible restrictions on activities or amenities that results from the presence of the structure.

    Non-structural measures are relatively less costly, and their implementation is often passive and unnoticed. For example, certain areas can be put under surveillance or passive security restrictions can be put in place. Active security measures are likely to be noticed, however. Financial measures can be taken to offset the costs for increased security. For example, grants and credits can be used to stimulate good mitigation practice, and taxation can also be used. Insurance is becoming increasingly popular as a means of putting income aside to pay for future losses. Concerns at this level for the long-term future of the disaster area are typical of the development, or secondary phase of total recovery. For example, the development phase may be characterized by concern over aesthetic features that should probably not be overlooked, as certain design factors in architecture (e.g., ornamentation, texture, flow, symmetry, and harmony) go a long way at restoring community ethic and serve utilitarian purposes as well.

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